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In 2006, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government led by Evo Morales took power in 
Bolivia. This government, supported by a pro-indigenous, anti-neoliberal electorate, has 
espoused indigenous rights and protections against neoliberal development in Bolivia’s national 
policies and Constitution. Through a case study of Bolivia’s Santa Cruz department, this paper 
examines Bolivia’s evolving state-social relationship and its increasingly divergent policies on 
economic development and indigenous rights. Santa Cruz’ marked presence of the transnational 
soy industry demonstrate the economic, social, and cultural rights challenges of a post-
neoliberal, pro-indigenous Bolivia. This research investigates the nexus between transnational 
agribusiness and the indigenous rights movement in the Bolivian context, and the social 
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Over the past decade in Latin America, a countercurrent to the neoliberal model of the late twentieth 
century has been termed the post-neoliberal “pink” tide. In this wave, burgeoning social movements and 
corresponding electoral shifts throughout Latin America have demanded an end the exploitative, 
globalized neoliberal model in favor of a new paradigm in which resource allocation and trade would be 
determined by the local, not the global.  
In 2006, Evo Morales and the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party came to power in Bolivia. The party 
ran on the platform of indigenous rights and a rejection of the neoliberal development model, and its 
electoral success was intrinsically tied to Morales’ coalescing of two main electorates: indigenous groups 
and peasant unions. This coalition took on a pro-indigenous platform (backed by the indigenous social 
movement base) and an anti-neoliberalism platform (backed by the peasant union base). 
In 2009, a pinnacle of this movement was seen with the newly adopted Constitution of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia that enshrined the ethos of post-neoliberalism.  The new Constitution was landmark for 
its inclusion and enumeration of extensive indigenous rights that mirrored international human rights 
instruments.1 A decade later, it is an opportune time to reflect on how much has truly changed for the 
human rights and livelihoods of indigenous people in in Bolivia. 
Bolivia’s economic development model is at odds with its pro-indigenous, post-neoliberal rhetoric 
promulgated by the Morales administration at international fora2 and enshrined in the Constitution. 
Increasingly, domestic and foreign capital flows into the country’s extractives industry3, a sector that 
hinges on the global capital market and its subsequent volatile prices. This research explores the human 
rights implications on indigenous peoples in the context of this paradox of reality vs. rhetoric of Bolivian 
                                                          
1 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 
Lessons from Bolivia,” The International Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 4 (2017): 450, doi: 
10.1080/13642987.2017.1284446.  
2 U.N. General Assembly, 69th Session. 7th Plenary Meeting. 24 Sept 2014 (A/69/PV.7) Official Record. 
3 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 
Lessons from Bolivia,” The International Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 4 (2017): 452, doi: 
10.1080/13642987.2017.1284446. Powęska notes that the extractives sector generated 70% of all export value in 
2013. Additionally, the overall area of gas and oil exploration has grown eightfold from 2006-2012 comprising 




post-neoliberalism.  Bolivia’s natural resource development as an economic pillar brings resource 
extraction and its impact on societies to the fore. This research will focus particularly on the burgeoning 
agro-industrial soy industry in the Santa Cruz region. The case study of Santa Cruz analyzes the various 
internal tensions that are coupled with the global soy complex.4 
Bolivia was a foremost actor in the indigenous rights movement of the twentieth century. During this 
movement, indigenous groups formed part of the opposition, predominantly stressing claims to 
indigenous land and education.5 However, at present they are part of Morales’ MAS coalition in power. It 
is therefore essential to analyze and understand how Bolivia’s modern indigenous rights movement is 
responding to these new economic trends of natural resource extraction in a “post-neoliberal” Bolivia 
under a central government that purportedly represents their demands.  
 Power asymmetries, lack of implementation and enforcement of indigenous and ecological rights 
protections, and foreign investment interests form a nexus that leads to infringements on human rights 
and livelihoods. This research explores the space between economic development and human rights 
practice in Santa Cruz, and what is being done by local social movement actors to reverse these dangerous 
trends. 
I. Research Strategy 
Objective 
Bolivia has espoused indigenous rights and protections in its national policies and discourse. Yet, in Santa 
Cruz, the state’s divergent policies on economic development and indigenous rights come to a head. Santa 
Cruz’ evolving socio-political tensions and the marked presence of the transnational soy industry 
demonstrate the human rights contradictions and challenges of a post-neoliberal, pro-indigenous Bolivia. 
                                                          
4 Saturnino M. Borras Jr. and Jennifer C. Franco, “Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: A 
Preliminary Analysis,” Journal of Agrarian Change 12, no. 1 (2012), 34, doi: 10.1111/j.1471-0366.2011.00339.x. 
As I define it, the global soy complex falls under Borras’ larger definition of land grabs and the “the explosion of 
(trans)national commercial land transactions and land speculation in recent years mainly, but not solely, around the 
large-scale production and export of food and biofuels.” 
5 Bret Gustafson, "Manipulating Cartographies: Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous Resurgence in 




The indigenous social movement that propelled the Morales government to power in 2006 is now at a 
crossroads. How are the indigenous social movement actors in Santa Cruz mobilizing to realize their 
indigenous and socio-economic rights? Are their previous social movement models and strategies 
deployed to propel the MAS to power in 2006 sufficient? Or, given the evolving state-social relationship 
between themselves and the Morales administration, are these local social movement actors engaging and 
organizing differently? If new strategies are being adopted, to what aim, and with what success? 
 
Theoretical Framework 
To frame the research, three conceptual frames will be applied: global economic development models, the 
state-social relationship, and indigenous challenges to extractivism. This thesis builds off of definitions of 
neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism in the Latin American context. Latin American-style neoliberalism 
can be defined as the wave of structural adjustment policies and reforms that injected an ethos of the 
market-led incentives and social and economic policies.6 Bolivian neoliberalism in particular followed 
this definition and was typified by trade liberalization, privatization of industries, deregulation, and social 
spending cuts.7  
The scholarship of David Harvey elaborates on neoliberalism with his theory of accumulation by 
dispossession.8 According to Harvey, the modern iteration of capital (neoliberalism) is characterized by 
centralized, hegemonic concentration of wealth at the expense and dispossession of public wealth—
whether this take form of benefits, land, or other forms of possession.  
                                                          
6 Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, “’Postneoliberalism and Social Inequalities in the Andes: Reflections and Hypotheses on 
the Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Ecuadorian Cases,” in A Moment of Equality for Latin America?: Challenge for 
Distribution, eds. B. Fritz and L. Lavinas (Surrey, Ashgate:2015): 55. 
7 Ben McKay, “New Dynamics and Trajectories of Agrarian Change in Bolivia: Regimes of Dispossession and the 
Rise of Brazil,” (panel, FLASCO-ISA Joint International Conference, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, 23-25 July 2014), 9. 






Accumulation by dispossession takes on many modern shapes and processes. According to Harvey, 
“[t]hese include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant 
populations; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression 
of alternative, indigenous forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial and imperial 
processes of appropriation of assets, including natural resources.”9 Key to this process is the role of the 
state and its sovereign monopoly on power to legally define and back such processes.10  
Paul O’Connell elaborates on the work of David Harvey, asserting that the neoliberal model is an affront 
to human rights both in theory and in practice.11 He argues that the neoliberal model is “part of a 
hegemonic project concentrating power and wealth in the elite groups around the world.”12 The neoliberal 
premise of an individualistic, interest-driven state that is backed by a faith in the market (with abdication 
of social responsibilities therein) is theoretically at odds with fundamental notions of human rights.13 The 
envisioned role of the state in these two approaches conflicts: The neoliberal model favors a “minimal 
state […] devoid of social responsibilities,”14 whereas the human rights approach and framework 
“presupposes a strong state with the capacity to meet the various human rights obligations placed upon 
it.”15 
O’Connell maintains that human rights and neoliberalism are furthermore incongruent in practice. 
Neoliberal reforms pushed for drastic cuts to public expenditures and programs resulting in “inequality 
and the systematic denial of the rights of poor and marginalized groups and access.”16 Thus, neoliberalism 
has created conditions that either provide barriers to the realization of human rights or has directly 
contributed to their violation.  
                                                          
9 Ibid, 74.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Paul O’Connell, “One Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights,” Human Rights 
Law Review 7, no. 3 (2007): 483-509, doi 10.1093/hrlr/ngm015. 
12 Ibid, 490. 
13 Ibid., 497. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 




The turn of the century ushered a new wave in Latin America, a “left turn,” which can be termed post-
neoliberalism.  My research borrows from the terminology of post-neoliberalism of Pérez Sáinz. He 
states, “[b]eyond a doubt, the most important event to mark the turn of this century in Latin America has 
been the so-called ‘left turn.’ In a number of Latin American countries, and through electoral processes, 
governments have come to power that profess the need to overcome neoliberalism, with varying degrees 
of radicalism.”17 I, like Sáinz, adopt the term while adding the caveat18 of skepticism in the definitive 
implications of the term. My thesis hypothesizes that Bolivia’s resource extraction and market-dependent 
economic model is a continuation of neoliberalism, and thus continues to be an affront to the human 
rights in Bolivia, in particular indigenous rights to self-determination. Much like the rhetoric of 
neoliberalism that touted economic growth as a measure to rid countries of poverty,19 rhetoric of Bolivia’s 
extractives sector development for national progress20 veils the continued violations of or barriers to 
realization of human rights.  
With regard to the second frame of state-social relationship and power asymmetries, my paper will draw 
from Bob Jessop’s strategic relational approach (SRA) to analyzing state power and power asymmetry. 
Jessop’s view of state power is that it is a “complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of 
social forces in a determinate conjuncture; a relation mediated through the instrumentality of juridical-
political institutions, political organizations and state capacities.”21 Jessop’s approach—along with 
                                                          
17 Juan Pablo Pérez Sáinz, “’Postneoliberalism and Social Inequalities in the Andes: Reflections and Hypotheses on 
the Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Ecuadorian Cases,” in A Moment of Equality for Latin America?: Challenge for 
Distribution, eds. B. Fritz and L. Lavinas (Surrey, Ashgate:2015): 53. 
18 Ibid. Sáinz notes, “Authors sympathetic with these experiments have hence begun utilizing the term 
“postneoliberalism,”suggesting that the previous order has been definitively overcome. We would regard such a 
position with skepticism, but neither do we believe that this is simply a redefinition of (neo)liberalism with a more 
“friendly” face, or behind a “progressive” mask”…Indeed we do not have enough historical perspective to make 
predictions at this point.” 
19 Paul O’Connell, “One Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights,” Human Rights 
Law Review 7, no. 3 (2007): 491, doi 10.1093/hrlr/ngm015. 
20 Andrew Canessa, “Conflict, Claim, and Contradiction in the New ‘Indigenous’ State of Bolivia,” Critique of 
Anthropology 34, no. 2 (2014): 164, doi: 10.1177/0308275X13519275. 
21 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 





Radoslaw Powęska’s 22 employment of Jessop’s SRA in the Bolivian context— elaborates on that states’ 
deployment of power structures. This approach will be instrumental in analyzing why it is that the 
Bolivian state disregards indigenous claims to natural resource control. 
Manuela Lavinas Picq puts forth her theory on indigenous self-determination as a challenge to 
exctractivism.23 Lavinas Picq asserts, “[Indigenous] claims against extractivism are ultimately claims to 
the right of self-determination. Indigenous claims are shaping political practice, framing international 
legislation, and destabilizing assumptions about the state. They seek the redistribution of rights as much 
as the uprooting of the concentration of power in the state. In that sense, Indigenous claims to 
consultation challenge the authority of states over natural resources as much as the organization of world 
politics does around Westphalian principles of sovereignty.”24  Lavinas Picq’s framing of claims to 
consultation and self-determination in the neo-extractivist context is useful for this research in my 
application of natural resource development and indigenous contestation. 
These frames are thus essential to my analysis on the current and imminent indigenous rights threats in 
Santa Cruz. As these frames exhibit, market forces and neo-extractivist control and resources upend and 
prioritize exploitation and rights limitations on indigenous rights over protections. 
 
Selection and Methods 
My research will have the time horizon of 2006-2016 as its unit of analysis. I have selected this period 
because the election of Evo Morales and the MAS party in 2006 presented a unique political opportunity 
for indigenous social movement actors that helped propel the party to power. By framing my research 
                                                          
22 As noted in the literature scan below, Powęska’s work elaborating Jessop’s strategic-relational approach in the 
Bolivian context will be a crucial reference point when framing my work on the relationship between the state and 
society, particularly indigenous actors.  
23Manuela Lavinas Picq, “Self-Determination as Anti-Extractivism: How Indigenous Resistance Challenges World 
Politics” excerpt online article from in Restoring Indigenous Self-Determination: Theoretical and Practical 
Approaches, ed. Mark Woons (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/21/self-
determination-as-anti-extractivism-how-indigenous-resistance-challenges-ir/. 




from 2006 onwards, the analysis will focus on the state-social relationship and the socio-political space 
created by the election for indigenous movement actors.  
With regard to the strategies employed, this research will analyze whether local groups rely on models 
that have worked in the past or whether their mobilization strategies have changed over time. Prior to the 
Morales’ election, mobilization of indigenous groups---predominantly by mass marches—sought to 
elevate the indigenous demands of land and autonomy, targeting the central government.25 However, 
given the electoral shift in 2006, the central government of Morales has purportedly been sympathetic 
to—and representative of— these indigenous demands as seen in the Constitution and public discourse of 
Morales in international fora. Therefore, my thesis seeks to analyze if the aims of mobilization are 
different given the shift in the state-social relationship; or, given the Morales administrations’ evolution 
and prioritization of economic development, are the indigenous strategies changing to adapt to the 
relationship with the state, and foreseeable threats to indigenous rights in Santa Cruz with the burgeoning 
soy industry.  
I have decided to focus my analysis on the soy industry in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Current literature 
correlates the neo-extractivist model of the Bolivian state with its negligence for indigenous self-
determination of natural resources,26 yet its primary focus is the hydrocarbon sector. With the decline in 
oil prices and overall global commodity shifts and new accumulation of capital, there is a shift towards 
soy production.27. Soy production accounts for the largest land use of Bolivia’s cultivated land with 37%28 
                                                          
25 Gustafson, Bret Gustafson, "Manipulating Cartographies: Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous 
Resurgence in Bolivia." Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2009): 989, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20638677.995. 
26 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 
Lessons from Bolivia,” The International Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 4 (2017): 442-463, doi: 
10.1080/13642987.2017.1284446. 
27Enrique Castañón Ballivián, “Empresas transnacionales agronegocio soyero,” Fundación Tierra (La Paz: 2017): 
19, http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/publicacion/documentos-de-trabajo/169-empresas-transnacionales-en-el-
agronegocio-soyero. 




of total cultivatable land devoted to soy production in 2014 (the second most—wheat—only accounted 
for 6.6%).29  
Santa Cruz is not only the home to 98% of large-scale soy production30 and therefore the appropriate 
geographic focus, but it is also a ‘colonial holdout’. This region has retained much of its hierarchical 
landowning structure pre-MAS and is ardent in its entrenched colonial classism.31 The current agrarian 
structure of the Santa Cruz soy industry is highly concentrated and oligarchic, and as a result has severe 
implications for small farmers, the environment, and indigenous peoples alike. What makes this ever-
more precarious for indigenous rights is the trajectory of the industry and harbingers for increased 
violations of indigenous self-determination as well as consultation rights.  
An ever-growing relationship between Santa Cruz and Morales administration since Morales’ second 
term (2009-2014) can be seen as a wearisome rapprochement that is based on the shared economic 
interests.32 Santa Cruz elites are cognizant of their clout and control of some of the most fertile and 
resource-rich territory in Bolivia, flex economic muscle for political means. Soy is the third largest 
industry (behind mining and oil) in Bolivia. With the recent drop in oil prices, the Bolivian government’s 
primary revenue source, alternative renewable industries are necessary to diversify the economy.33 This 
fact is not lost on the Santa Cruz elites, “The need for soy expansion, a renewable resource, is necessary 
for the vitality of Bolivia.”34 The current economic ambitions and nationalist agenda of the Morales 
administration has set the stage for apt conditions to coalesce around these shared interests.   
Bolivia’s emphasis on soy production presents a risk for further expansion into limited land and 
deforestation for soy cultivation in indigenous territories. In fact, not only do historic land-owning elites 
                                                          
29 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), “Información Estadística,” (2011), http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php.  
30 Ibid., 14. 
31 Ibid., 16 
32 Ministra de Autonomías. Agenda Patriótica 2025. La Paz (2013). http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/ 
    pdf/bol141864.pdf. 
33 Interview conducted with soy association representative, July 2017. 




favor increased production, but the Bolivian state itself (otherwise many times at odds with these elites) is 
pushing production.35 Therefore, research analyzing the soy complex in Bolivia and its impact on claims 
to land, resources, and ultimately livelihoods is essential.  
This research uses mixed methods that includes both primary qualitative data collection and primary and 
secondary qualitative and quantitative data sourcing. Qualitative primary data was collected using semi-
structured interviews with local civil society organizations (CSOs) and indigenous activists to analyze the 
power structures in place and how these local CSOs engage with these dynamics to claim their rights to 
autonomy and self-determined resource governance. The aim of the CSO interviews was to understand 
the real-time mobilization strategies and challenges. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted with a representative from a soy association to collect the converse perspective to understand 
the fuller context and dynamics at play. My interview conducted with the soy association aimed to 
understand the soy agribusiness goals in the region and whether these goals interplay or interact with 
social movement actors. Do they see themselves as adversarial in Santa Cruz indigenous claims to 
resource management? Do they see themselves as supportive? Neutral?  
Qualitative primary data sources included international and national legal texts, legislation as well as 
policy documents outlining government strategy on policies. In addition to scholarly journals, qualitative 
secondary data collection included reports and publications by local CSOs and historians as well as local 
and international news sources. Quantitative secondary sources used include data on land titling by the 
Bolivian agrarian census.  
Current Research 
My thesis draws from the scholarly discipline of human rights and economic development. As such, I 
evaluated current literature that focused on the nexus of human rights, indigenous social movements, land 
rights, and agricultural development.  
                                                          
35 Ben McKay, “New Dynamics and Trajectories of Agrarian Change in Bolivia: Regimes of Dispossession and the 
Rise of Brazil,” (panel, FLASCO-ISA Joint International Conference, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 




There is an abundance of research on the global phenomenon of land grabs.36 However, there is far less 
literature on land grabbing trends in Latin America, as the predominant focus of research is in sub-
Saharan Africa or East Asia. Land grabs are an important corollary to my research as limited access and 
availability of cultivatable land is matched by growing demand for increased production. Therefore, this 
stark competition for land plays into existing resource power asymmetries and therefore must be explored 
when discussing resource control in Santa Cruz.  
The leading researcher on the trend of land grabbing in Latin America is Saturnino M. Borras Jr. Borras 
argues that land grabs in Latin America are not only overlooked internationally due to narrowly-defined 
terms of land grabbing, but have unique regional characteristics. In sum, Borras’ work on Latin American 
land grabs in relation to this research focuses on (but is not limited to): land-use change to support flex 
crops and mono-cropping, trans-regional and domestic investors, and state support vis-à-vis assertions of 
sovereignty to displaced populations.37 Borras’ research highlights the underestimation of transregional 
investment as well as the perpetual use of state force.  
Miguel Altieri and Ben McKay also add additional literature, respectively, along the topic of export-led 
mono-cropping38 and its harmful impacts on small-farmer livelihoods.  Altieri, an ecological scholar and 
proponent of agro-ecological39 approaches to agriculture, is weary of the export-dependent global farming 
system and mono-cropping practices. His scholarship asserts that the global agro-export scheme has 
                                                          
36 Borras Jr., Saturnino M., et al, “Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Journal of Peasant Studies 
39, nos. 3-4 (2012): 845-872, doi: 10.1080/03066150.2012.679931. 
37 Ibid, 847. Borras advocates that the FAO definition falls short in holistically assessing size, scale, and rapidity of 
acquisitions and its impact on the population.  
38 Mono-cropping is the cultivation of a single crop (as opposed to the diversification of crops, poly-cropping) in a 
given area.  
39 Miguel A. Altieri, et al. “Agroecologically Efficient  Agricultural Systems for Smallholder Farmers: Contributions 
to Food Sovereignty.” Agronomy for Sustainable Development 32, no.1 (2012): 4. 10.1007/s13593-011-0065-6. As 
Altieri defines it, agroecological approaches consist of diverse, polyculture small-scale farmer outputs that better 




coopted the anti-poverty and hunger eradication language of development, only to be effectively 
perpetrating hunger and dependence.40 
Similarly, McKay highlights this mono-cropping trend in Santa Cruz and its impact on market-dependent 
smallholder’s loss of land autonomy. He notes, “[a]s the expansion of soybean plantations has 
continued…traditional peasant farmers have been transitioning from their ‘peasant way’ of cultivating 
traditional to a capital intensive model of mechanized agriculture for export…This came at the cost of 
entering into such value-chain relations of debt and dependency and the loss of autonomy of their land.”41 
He argues that the mono-cropping and flex cropping patterns of the globalized export-driven agriculture 
present in Santa Cruz’s soy production constitutes unsustainable agricultural development that is harmful 
to local livelihoods. 
Research by Ben McKay further provides empirical data on land concentration for soy production in 
Santa Cruz. McKay’s research is integral for its contribution not only on land control in Santa Cruz, but 
he also provides insight into the power politics in the region and the influential role of land-owning elites 
and Brazilian investors. This is crucial for a stakeholder analysis and for understanding the contextual 
nuances and power asymmetries at play. McKay’s illustration of the current practices of the cruceño42 soy 
industry has striking links to Harvey’s theory on new methods of dispossession. McKay asserts that new 
methods of dispossession in value chain control (accumulation by dispossession) drive a vicious cycle of 
dependency and loss of livelihood in Santa Cruz for small farmers. 43 While McKay does not adopt a 
                                                          
40 Miguel A. Altieri, et al. “Agroecologically Efficient  Agricultural Systems for Smallholder Farmers: Contributions 
to Food Sovereignty.” Agronomy for Sustainable Development 32, no.1 (2012): 7,  10.1007/s13593-011-0065-6. 
41Ben McKay, “BRICS and MICs in Bolvia’s ‘Value’-Chain Agriculture,” BRICs Initiative in Critical Agrarian 
Studies (2015): 8,  https://www.tni.org/en/publication/brics-and-mics-in-bolivias-value-chain-agriculture. 
42 Cruceño is a descriptive term that indicates one who is from the Santa Cruz region.  
43Ben McKay, “BRICS and MICs in Bolvia’s ‘Value’-Chain Agriculture,” BRICs Initiative in Critical Agrarian 
Studies (2015): 9, https://www.tni.org/en/publication/brics-and-mics-in-bolivias-value-chain-agriculture. “The 
introduction of GM soybeans has opened up new market opportunities for agribusiness as […] a new frontier of 
accumulation. Rather than land purchases, transnational capital can still appropriate value from industrial agriculture 
via agro-inputs, storage and processing facilities, credit and debt relations, and export markets…Short-term credit 
and growing contracts have bound farmers into […] a cycle of indebtedness and control that has the potential to 




human rights frame to his research, his data and summary of power structures and interests in Santa Cruz 
are a key source of literature on the implications of the penetration of the soy industry in the region. 
Of particular importance for my research is literature that focuses on the human rights dimensions to 
agricultural development. The canon of work of international institutions on the topic of human rights and 
agribusiness has steadily developed in the past decade given the rise in the global food regime the 
continued deepening of transnational capital ties to farmers in the developing world. The work of Special 
Rapporteur Olivier De Schutter is a foremost source in this regard. Throughout his tenure as Special 
Rapporteur, De Schutter produced several reports, briefs, and recommendations 44 on the role of the state 
and agri-business alike to respect human rights, and that investments be guided by the need to ensure the 
right to self-determination and development by the local. 45  My research explains that though enumerated 
by the Constitution, indigenous rights to self-determination and development in Bolivia are not ensured. 
Rather, the state’s narrow definitions and weak implementation n of these rights spell out further 
violations rather than realization.  
The research of Radoslaw Powęska examines46 the MAS platform of indigenous rights against the state’s 
control over indigenous natural resources. He illustrates how the state’s extractivist hydro-carbon model 
reinforces power asymmetries at the cost of indigenous populations, as this very extraction (as I will 
discuss later) violates the indigenous rights to self-determination and consultation. The Bolivian 
hydrocarbon extraction model is a redistributive model that redistributes surpluses from state hydrocarbon 
extraction to social programs, primarily the non-contributory universal pension program, Renta 
                                                          
44 U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Archive: “What is the role of agribusiness in the realization of the 
right to food”, http://www.srfood.org/en/agribusiness.  
45 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Large-scale land 
acquisitions and leases: A set of minimum principles and measures to address the human rights challenge, 
A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (28 December 2009): 3. 
46 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 





Dignidad.47 Powęska’s correlation between state-social relationships and extractivism is key. As long as 
the state-led hydrocarbon is redistributed universally, the natural resource claims of the indigenous will 
remain unheard or become secondary, as the sector’s surplus is fueling the fund. The state’s redistribution 
model, according to Powęska, therefore bolsters political support for resource extractivism and provides 
Morales with the electoral mandate to continue nationalist extractivism. The state-social relationship is 
therefore revised, yet does not replace the existing structure of inequality.  
The work of Bret Gustafson is seminal research in his analysis of the rise of indigenous rights activism 
and social movements in Bolivia from the early 1990s to 2006.48 He provides key background into the 
political opportunity structure of lowland indigenous activists as well as regional tensions prior to the 
MAS ascension to power. However, the time horizon of his research is prior to the electoral shift, and 
thus helpful for historical background rather than current analysis.  
Therefore, gaps in scholarship lie in the nexus of the time horizon and sectoral research. There is scant 
literature49 on post-2006 indigenous resistance to the MAS. Similarly, there is an abundance of research 
on the growing concentration of land for soy production in Santa Cruz50, yet little exploration of how 
indigenous rights actors are mobilizing against this development and associated threats. In the Bolivian 
context, research focuses more heavily in this regard on the hydro-carbon and mining sectors, yet I argue 
that soy/ production is growing at an alarming rate and thus literature is needed to address this gap.  
Human Rights Instruments: Overview 
The Bolivian state has a duty in upholding and effectively implementing human rights guaranteed in the 
relevant international human rights instruments. In regards to international law on indigenous rights, 
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Bolivia ratified Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 199151 and voted in 
favor of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007.52 Bolivia not only 
voted in favor of the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007, but the same year converted it into the national 
law (National Act NR 3760).53 At the adoption of a new Constitution in 2009, the Bolivian state took the 
espousal of international human rights even further, including specific enumerations to indigenous 
peoples, in particular the right to development, self-determination and territoriality.54 Articles 30, 352, 
403 of the new Bolivian constitution guarantee the right to free, prior and informed consultation on 
decisions that would affect the interest of indigenous peoples.55 The Constitution guarantees consultation, 
but does not go as far as consent, a requirement in the UNDRIP.. Though Bolivia has signed and adopted 
international and national human rights instruments, the weak implementation of such enumerated rights 
illustrates the growing gap between rhetoric and reality for human rights.  
II. Power Asymmetries and Regimes 
The contextual background of power asymmetries at play in Bolivia is necessary to understand and 
analyze how these dynamics impact the enjoyment and implementation of human rights. This section 
looks into two primary hubs of power: the state-social relationship of the central government under the 
Morales administration and the regional power dynamics between elites and business interests, 
indigenous groups, and non-indigenous campesinos in Santa Cruz.  
State-social relationship: Policies, Practices, and Implications 
The Bolivian state’s relationship to society, in particular to its majority56 demographic of indigenous  
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groups, has transformed since the advent of the Morales administration in 2006. Morales and the MAS 
came to power promulgating a dual platform of neo-indigeneity and nationalism57, with each bolstering a 
specific electorate needed to sustain political hegemony. Since the TIPNIS event in 2011, however, there 
has been growing distance between the two platforms, and the economic models and nationalism-cum-
extractivism can been seen as the dominant policy strategy.58  
A pillar of Morales’ trend towards increased economic development vis-à-vis the extractives industry is 
his usage of nationalistic sentiment59 to defend his rationale and policies. Morales sees the demands of 
indigenous groups as a roadblock to what he views as the greater national interest, using extractivist 
development as the vehicle for his nationalistic discourse. He states, “[T]they [indigenous groups] want 
the consultation to be binding. That’s impossible; it’s nonnegotiable…Letting a group of families tell us 
what to do would mean paralyzing all our work on electrification, hydrocarbons and industries.”60 This 
nationalist discourse pins national interest (economic development) against dissent and opposition 
(indigenous claims to consultation), and Morales sees his electoral dominance as an executive mandate, or 
carte blanche, to act on behalf of the “national interest.”61  
The central pillar of Morales’ neo-extractivist resource nationalism is consistent with Harvey’s 
“accumulation by dispossession” theory on neoliberalism.  The support62 of economic development vis-à-
vis the extractives industry by Morales administration illustrates the prioritization of development at the 
expense of indigenous rights, namely the Constitutional right to free, prior and informed consultation.  
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Consultation and Contestation 
The Bolivian Constitution requires obligatory previous consultation for projects within their territory. 
Article 30.II.15, in particular, states, “The indigenous communities enjoy the right to be consulted by 
appropriate procedures, through its institutions, each time that legislative and administrative measures are 
likely to affect them. The right to previous obligatory consultation will be respected and guaranteed by 
the state, in good faith, with respect to the exploitation of non-renewable resources in areas that they 
live.”63  
Contrary to this is Morales’ economic policy that advances the notion of extractives as exceptional and 
imperative for national interest. This can be seen in a multitude of supreme decrees (SDs). In 2010, 
Morales issued Supreme Decree 0676, which opened up previously protected natural areas for 
hydrocarbon exploitation.64 In 2015, SD 2366 followed suit with additional extractive expansion into 
protected areas.65 SD 2195 of 2014 set ceilings for the compensation payments of hydrocarbon projects 
that were made to inhabitants on collective lands.66 SD 2298 revised the duration of prior consultation 
processes from 60 days to 45 days.67  
Morales has been on-record defending his use of SDs for advancing extractivism through nationalist 
postures. “It is not possible that we lose so much time with the so-called consultations; this is a great 
weakness of our state, of our people. We are modifying some norms with the single objective of 
accelerating investment and obtaining more natural resources to benefit the Bolivian people.”68 Again, 
                                                          
63 Luis Yañez Valdez, Derechos Humanos y Proceso de Cambio: Análisis de la situación de los derechos humanos 
en Bolivia bajo el Gobierno de Evo Morales durante el periodo 2006-2016 (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Gente de 
Blanco, 2016): 111-112 (author’s translation).  
64 Radoslaw Powęska, “State-led Extractivism and the Frustration of Indigenous Self-Determined Development: 
Lessons from Bolivia,” The International Journal of Human Rights 21, no. 4 (2017): 452, doi: 
10.1080/13642987.2017.1284446. 
65 Ibid. 
66 “Decreto Supremo No. 2195 Evo Morales Ayma Presidente Constitucional de la Republica,” La Paz: Gaceta 
Oficial de Bolivia (2014). a 
67Decreto Supremo No. 2298  Evo Morales Ayma Presidente Constitucional de la Republica,” La Paz: Gaceta 
Oficial de Bolivia (2015).   
68 Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, “Who Controls the Territory and Resources? Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) 





Morales postures that consultations are timely and stand in the way of economic development and 
Bolivian prosperity, further pinning the indigenous rights to consultation against nationalist sentiment. 
While consultation on development projects is recognized in the Constitution (Articles 30, 352, 403)69, 
the government has failed to adopt detailed regulations and implementation of consultative processes. 
Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees consultation, but does not go so far as consent. Article 30.15.III 
of the Bolivian Constitution is nearly verbatim to the UNDRIP Article 19 that requires states to “consult 
and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous people concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”70 However, the Bolivian constitution leaves 
out the reference to ‘free, prior and informed consent’. This stark abstention of “free, prior and informed 
consent” (FPIC) from Article 30 was purposeful. The aim of the state, as seen in its actions and policies, 
is not full indigenous self-determination; but rather vestiges of participation that are reduced to a ‘rubber-
stamping’ of development projects.71 This leaves room for narrow interpretations and manipulations by 
the state. “The interpretation of which rights diverse groups possess determines who has the right to 
exercise political control over people and resources…and who can exploit them economically and profit 
from this exploitation.”72 
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The Guaraní case in the eastern lowlands is a prime example. The Guaranís have been active in the 
indigenous rights movement in Bolivia registering the incipient rights demands in the 1990s that set the 
plurinational revolution in motion.  Moreover, in contemporary Bolivia, the Guaranís are leading activists 
in the opposition to gas projects, given the wealth of natural gas located in the Guaraní territories that 
stretch across the southeast Chaco region (across Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, and Tarija) of Bolivia73.”74 
The state legally defines territoriality to include subsoil resources,75 and stipulates itself as the exclusive 
owner of subsoil resources and the decisions on their use and administration in the Constitution. 76The 
Guaraní, however, view land as holistic and including surface and land and subsoil territory.77 Indigenous 
groups can only realize their right to consultation if they obtain legal recognition of territory.78 However, 
it is the state itself that issues these formal titles, thus promulgating their power hierarchy as the 
sovereign.79 
In the Guaraní case, not only do the Guaranís traditionally view territory more expansively than the legal 
definition, but they also have been blocked from land ownership by the formalization process itself. Since 
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the introduction of the legal recognition of indigenous communal lands of origin (TCOs) in 1996, only 
32.8 percent of Guaraní claims have been formally registered as of 2010.80 As Powęska states, “Despite 
the fact that legal frameworks regulating indigenous territorial recognition have existed… there are many 
cases when the processes cannot be concluded for decades, depriving the local populations of their 
rights.”81 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy (MHE) is charged with classifying territory. 82 
Only “Category 1” projects are classified as projects that will have a considerable impact on indigenous 
territories protected areas; and it is only these MHE-classified Category 1 projects that require prior 
consultation.83 Thus, projects planned in contested territory—based on contested Guaraní-state definitions 
of territory—do not undergo the process of consultation.84 The state has an immense upper hand in the 
consultation process in that it hold the power to issue formalized territorial recognition required of an 
indigenous group to enter such a process. As seen in the Guaraní case, in instances where indigenous 
contestations abut economic interests of the state’s development projects, the indigenous territorial 
recognition is brought into question.  Thus, in the face of gas projects in the Chaco, the Guaranís are faced 
with a loss of participation and self-determination.  
Civil Society Suppression 
Beyond the issue of consultation, prime instances of the evolving state-social relationship can be seen in 
the growing suppression of civil society and opposition in Bolivia by the Morales administration.  
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The “NGO law”, formally the Law on Legal Entities/Law 351 shows the state’s aim to minimize 
participation and opposition. Passed in 2013, this law stipulates that an organization’s permit to operate 
“can be revoked if it performs activities different from those listed in its statute, or if it violates the law 
and its regulatory decrees.”85 The strenuous relationship between the administration and NGOs largely 
began following TIPNIS.86 
The most common tactic of the Morales administration to hamper NGOs voices is the predominant use of 
threats, intimidation, and personal disqualifications. 87 This tactic is not reserved just for NGOs, but for 
any critic opposing the extractivist policies. The most notable case here is that of Ombusdman Villena. 
The Ombusperson, or defensoría del pueblo, is a constitutionally-mandated88 position charged with 
overseeing “the enforcement, promotion, dissemination of and compliance with human rights, both 
individual and collective, that are established in the Constitution, laws and international instruments.”89 
The Morales government has undertaken a series of attacks that seek to defame the reputation and 
legitimacy of the MAS-appointed Ombudsman Villena.90 Villena has been outspoken on the issue of 
indigenous rights and consultation. For instance, in 2015, Villena made a statement at the Second World 
Conference of Indigenous Communities on Climate Change chastising the extractivist practices of the 
government and the risk it poses to indigenous groups and the environment alike. 91 In response to these 
and other such actions and statements against the human rights record of the government, there has been 
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significant backlash and strategy to discredit Villena. Minister Romero called him a ‘defender of 
criminals/delinquents’; Vice President García-Linera accused him of being a ‘hypocrite’ and a ‘politician 
camouflaged’ and furthermore signaled that the management of the office of the Ombudsman under 
Villena was the “worst that existed.”92 On two occasions his home has been set fire while his wife was 
inside, without a sound investigation by the authorities into the matter.93  
It is apparent that the central government’s policies and practices have created a space where resource 
nationalism is the true law of the land regardless of what is enshrined in the Constitution. Challenges to 
the state’s extractivist economic development policy are met by policy designed to create narrow 
definitions of space and rights. These policies contain significant caveats that constrain the efficacy and 
full realization of these rights.  
Regional Social Tensions: Cruceño Context 
The second nexus of power asymmetries is the regional power dynamics in the eastern lowland 
department of Santa Cruz.   
Santa Cruz is historically home to entrenched colonial hierarchies of white (karai) and mestizo largescale 
land ownership.94 The Santa Cruz elite have been ardently vocal—and violent—in their racist, anti-
indigenous posture. 95 Santa Cruz’s inter-social power relations are far from simplistic reductions of Santa 
Cruz elites vs. Santa Cruz indigenous groups. Rather, contemporary tensions form a nexus of inter-
indigenous and regional alliances that, though have existed prior to Morales, have been heightened by 
Morales’ Andean tilt in preferential policies.96  
                                                          
92 Ibid, 160. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Bret Gustafson, "Manipulating Cartographies: Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous Resurgence in 
Bolivia." Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2009): 985-1016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20638677.995. 
95 Ibid, 1011.  
96 Andrew Canessa, “Conflict, Claim, and Contradiction in the New ‘Indigenous’ State of Bolivia,” Critique of 




Central to the understanding of how different social groups in Santa Cruz interact is the understanding of 
the regionalism and autonomy principles put forth by Santa Cruz elites. Once its own autonomous region 
prior to the unification of what is now modern Bolivia, Santa Cruz has always sought greater 
independence from La Paz.97 However, since the indigenous movements of the 1990s, conservative elite 
reactions have developed a co-opted definition of autonomy that seeks to extend the elite-indigenous 
power hierarchy and drive a wedge between marginalized groups, thereby extending the hierarchical 
status quo.98 This new “autonomy” seeks to re-inscribe regional difference and thereby fracture unity 
between the transregional indigenous movements.99 To this effect, elites in Santa Cruz have co-opted 
autonomy as a power tool, drawing upon long-standing highland-lowland tensions.  
Beginning in the 1960s under the policies of the U.S.-crafted Bohan Plan, or “March to the East,” a 
migration of Andean highland indigenous peoples (predominantly Aymara and Quechua peoples) were 
given land and incentives to farm the fertile eastern lowlands.100 These highland migrants became known 
as colonos, or colonizers.101 By 1980, 41% of the population in Santa Cruz was comprised of these 
highland “colonos.”102  Elites seek to appeal to five indigenous groups “native” to the Santa Cruz region 
using the discourse of the “other” that pins native Santa Cruz indigenous groups against the “foreign” 
highland migrant population.103 This tactic, according to Gustafson, “creates convenient enemies within 
the region: the Andean migrant or disloyal local indigenes who support the plurinationalist 
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agenda…Rightwing autonomists speak of Quechua and Aymara migrants in eastern Bolivia as "ethnic 
cysts" and "hostile ethnics."104  
Though eastern lowland indigenous groups allied with highlanders in social movements of the 1990s and 
early 2000s with the aim of casting off their entrenched hierarchies of cruceño karai elites, the evolution 
of Morales’ agenda has disillusioned many lowland indigenous groups. The MAS’ strong Andean 
symbolism and highland roots are discordant with the indigenous demands of the east. This divergence 
between the highlands and the eastern lowland indigenous synergy is exemplified with TIPNIS, wherein 
lowland indigenous protests to extractivist projects put forth by the Morales administration were 
suppressed violently by highland supporters of Morales.105  
Morales’ redistributive rhetoric106  is seen by elites in Santa Cruz as a threat to their economic livelihood 
and existing power structure.107 This ambivalent sentiment is matched by growing disillusion seen by 
lowland indigenous groups. Herein the elites have capitalized on the growing discord as an opportunity to 
further rift inter-indigenous tensions and reinforce power structures via autonomy rhetoric.108 
This co-optation has been successful in stoking regionalism and highland-lowland indigenous tensions. 
For instance, in interviews conducted with indigenous rights activists in Santa Cruz, the term 
“indigenous” and the respective rights therein were strictly reserved for indigenous population native to 
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Santa Cruz. Aymara or Quechua peoples living in the east are seen “native” cruceño mestizo and 
indigenous alike as campesinos not indígenas.109 Though eastern indigenous groups remain cast out of 
Morales’ agenda, they also have fallen susceptible to elite manipulation of highland-lowland tensions. 
Eastern lowland groups are being quelled by predominant power structures both by the MAS and 
Morales’ policies and by the reinforcing of traditional power structures in Santa Cruz vis-à-vis autonomy. 
Both tactics of the prevailing powers –the MAS and Santa Cruz elites—is to schism and divide 
opposition, effectively hindering viable mobilization attempts.  
III. Soy in Santa Cruz 
The previous sections have illuminated the evolving state-social, elite-indigenous, and inter-indigenous 
dynamics both regionally and nationally. With this essential framing, my research will now pivot to the 
soy sector in Santa Cruz. The nature of the agro-industry in Santa Cruz signals a furthering of 
marginalization, power asymmetries, and rights violations. A dangerous growing precedent of impunity 
and disregard for constitutionally-ascribed protections is already under way in Bolivia.   
Industry Backdrop 
 Soy production in Santa Cruz did not come to the fore until the end of the 20th century. The first “boom” 
in soy production was from 1993-1997. This boom stemmed from the 1990 World Bank “Western 
Lowlands” project, strongly supported the soy production sector through the development of 
communications infrastructure, storage, and plant oil industry.110 As McKay notes, “Brazilians and 
Argentineans took advantage of extremely low land prices. Trade liberalization, financial deregulation 
and the World Bank’s USD $56.4 million ‘Eastern Lowlands Project’ facilitated this large-scale land 
expansion for export-oriented industrial agriculture.” 111 Neoliberal in nature, this project—through its 
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support for market liberalization, infrastructure, and credit access—still favored the large-scale properties 
that were owned by the concentrated elites and capitalists.112 
The introduction of motorized equipment during this boom transformed the production system in Santa 
Cruz. 113 Greater access to mechanized equipment for soy production led to the curtailing of the previous 
labor-intensive native crops, such as peanuts and rice.114 The 1990s saw a growing abandonment of 
native, diversified crops, in favor of the mono-cropping of the commercial soy crop, primarily for export. 
In fact, from 1990-1996, agricultural exports from Santa Cruz increased by 400%.115  
Santa Cruz’ second soy boom that began in 2003 was attributed to the global price of soy and the 
relatively stable year-to-year price that motivated farmers in Santa Cruz to dedicate themselves—and 
almost all their land—to soy production.116 
Bolivia’s soy explosion has transformed Bolivia’s agriculture sector. In 1972, only 800 ha of soy were 
harvested in Santa Cruz;117 and by 1991, 200,000 ha of cultivated land were devoted to soy.118 This pace 
has only increased with Bolivia’s entry into the global soy market. Between 1991 and 2013, this 
cultivated land for soy increased by 500%, or 1,237,000 ha in absolute terms.119 
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Cultivated land area for soy has dramatically grown over the past two decades. At present, 37%120 of 
cultivatable Bolivian land is used for soy production, making it the largest crop in the country.121 Of this, 
98% of cultivatable land for soy is located in Santa Cruz.122 The orientation of this crop is primarily for 
export: only 25% of Bolivian soy is for domestic consumption, with the majority of exports sent to the 
Andean Confederation of Nations, Colombia in particular.123 
The primary actors in Bolivian agriculture in general can be divided up into three groups: 1) large-scale, 
agro-industrial producers (export-oriented); 2) small-scale peasant production; 3) communal indigenous 
landholdings.124 However, the indigenous communal lands rarely partake in the commercial soy 
production.125  
It should be noted that the term “peasant” is convoluted across data sets on land holdings and agricultural 
production in Santa Cruz. The classifications of producers are divided by land ownership types (small, 
medium, large), not ethnicity. A small-scale peasant producer can also be ethnically indigenous. Research 
conducted by Webber refers to the small scale sector in Santa Cruz as the “indigenous-peasant” sector.126 
Yet Webber does not go into further detail about the make-up of this constituency. Other classifications 
only define indigenous groups as those occupying formalized TCOs.127 Therefore, prevailing problems 
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exist in the data collection that does not incorporate the Bolivian plurinational context, making it difficult 
to comprehensively determine the indigenous participation in the soy value chain. 
The cruceño soy industry is predominantly comprised of small scale farmers. According ANAPO, the soy 
producers association, 78% of total soy producers in Santa Cruz are small scale farmers. Yet this majority 
only controls a scant 9% of cultivated land.128 
The concentration of wealth in Santa Cruz is a preeminent concern. Export-oriented farming has been in 
the hands of the elites and capitalist entrepreneurs, and redistribution attempts—such as the 1996 Land 
Law—have failed129 in Santa Cruz largely due to political resistance and economic clout of the elites.130 
Furthermore, of the lands transferred to TCO status, 72.8% were transfers from state-owned property to 
TCO, rather than expropriation.131  
A key component to the power dynamics of the soy industry in Santa Cruz is its transnational character, 
most notably through the investments of Brazilian companies. Brazilians’ controlled 40.3% of the total 
soy plantation area in Bolivia during the 2006-2007 soy campaign.132 Comparatively, in 1994-1995 
campaign, this figure was 19.6%.133 It is estimated that Brazilian capital controls 1.2 million of Bolivia’s 
2.86 million ha of cultivated land available, though data estimates are incomplete and the figure could in 
fact be higher.134  
Control of soy production, and its exportation, is highly concentrated and exclusive. Six companies 
control 95% of the production of soy for export: Gaveltal Bolivia, Industria de Aceites, Archer Daniel 
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Midland SAO, Industrias Oleaginosas, Cargill Bolivia, and Bunge.135 As McKay and Colque describe, 
“Transnational investors operating through these companies have captured vast shares of Bolivia’s 
storage, processing, and export markets.”136  
Implications: 
Implications for Small-holders  
Although Morales’ agenda and discourse in international fora has espoused the objective of dismantling 
the colonial hierarchies and power structures,137 Bolivia’s agrarian transformation vis-à-vis Santa Cruz’s 
soy production has had converse implications on the livelihoods of the vulnerable. Rather than casting off 
colonial power structures, the asymmetries of power have taken on different forms of dispossession. As 
Ben McKay and Gonzalo Colque assert, “Current state policies have actually reproduced dependency 
relationships with agro-industrial capital, thereby not providing any alternative pathways for small 
farmers or peasants through neo-collectivist agrarian development.”138 
Santa Cruz soy industry’s oligarchical control constrains small farmers into little options. There is little 
viable agricultural alternative outside the soy production chain , as soy’s “market prices and demand from 
large multinational controlling storage, processing and distribution entices even capital-poor family 
farmers with less than 50 ha of land and no access to machinery to enter the ‘soy complex.”139  The viable 
inputs and marketing needed to sustain a small farm is intrinsically tied to and monopolized by the soy 
industry. By joining soy’s value chain, the subsequent result is often indebtedness (purchasing or renting 
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machinery and other inputs) and little mobility within the sector given its high concentration of 
ownership.140 This creates a cycle of dependency and exploitative power relationship between the small 
scale farmer and production chain.141  
A key implication on the smallholder is the loss of autonomy over land. Rather than land-grabbing in the 
physical sense, what is occurring in Santa Cruz are new forms of dispossession: Most small-scale farmers 
rent their land and enter into a “contract farming” relationship.”142 According to the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, contract farming is 
“an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and supply of 
agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices.”143When a 
smallholder enters into these supply contracts, they enter this transnational soy complex, dependent on 
agro-industrial inputs (seeds, chemicals) and the credit needed to purchase these inputs.144  
In Santa Cruz, the safety measures to ensure a mutually-beneficial contract relationship are often ignored. 
Companies often reset prices when grains reach the storage facility to a price that was less than the 
proposed price at harvest. The smallholder is then often stuck in an unfair price setting scenario: should 
he/she renegotiate, the cost of re-transport and withdrawal from the silo is greater than renegotiated lower 
price.145  
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What is especially precarious in the Santa Cruz case is that the entire soy cycle (inputs and exports) is 
controlled by this transnational capital. Transnational capital has a monopolistic control both on 
inputs146—such as seeds, agro-chemicals, silos—and the export market. For instance, of the 
approximately 9,400 tons of milled soy processed per day, 67% is controlled by transnational capital.147  
These large transnational companies operate in ubiquity, and coordinate with each other at different links 
of the production process, opting many times to operate through intermediaries or subsidiaries.148 Thus, 
this well-orchestrated soy oligarchy can block alternatives outside their own, limiting the choices of 
small-scale farmers.149 There is an oligarchy over the entirety of the soybean market by only six 
companies that are able to set their desired prices.150 Without having to own the land, transnational capital 
has, in essence, been able to exercise access and control over smallholder land.  
Right to Food and Santa Cruz’s Agribusiness 
To realize the right to food, Special Rapporteur Olivier De Schutter emphasizes the need for sustainable 
food systems based on the principle of diversification.151 In the case of Bolivia, the agrarian systems of 
Santa Cruz have significantly shifted in the past three decades. As indicated above, 37% of cultivatable 
land is dominated by soy, which is primarily mono-cropped for export, leaving little crop diversity that 
De Schutter discussed. 152   
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The current power asymmetries in contract farming typical of Santa Cruz’s agrarian structure is typified 
by De Schutter as having severe implications for “the welfare of producers and consumers.”153 De 
Schutter elaborates, “[t]he resulting market structure gives buyers considerable bargaining strength over 
their suppliers…Concentration in buying markets is particularly worrying, and even more so than 
concentration in selling markets, because dominance in buying markets can be achieved with a relatively 
small market share.”154 In Santa Cruz’s soy ecosystem, what is particularly worrisome is the extensive 
concentration of ownership of both buying and selling markets by same group of transnational capital 
owners that actively ensure that competition and control remains in select hands.  
The right to food is threatened because this agrarian structure negatively impacts the livelihoods of small-
scale farmers, limiting their economic choices, and creating a cycle of debt and dependency.155 De 
Schutter analyzes this structural dimension of agribusiness through the lens of the right to food and 
asserts that the entrapment of small-scale farmers in debt as well as power asymmetries in contract 
farming and price-setting inhibit the enjoyment of the right to food. 156What is critical to note in this 
discussion is the terminology used by international institutions in their definition of land-grabs that do not 
aptly incorporate this new iteration of dispossession. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 
has identified land—and access its productive resources—as an essential condition for realizing the right 
to food.157 Yet, the framing of land grabs and their resulting harms to the right to food continues to be 
through the narrow lens of dispossession in the physical sense: largescale land acquisitions.158  In the case 
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of Bolivia, the dispossession and loss of autonomy of small scale soy farmers has evolved and widespread 
displacement is not common in Santa Cruz.159 Rather, the new dynamics of dispossession that follow the 
framework put forth by Saturnino Borras are akin to limited autonomy over resources based on the global 
capital market the framework. 160 Borras asserts that modern dispossession by agribusiness is more often 
less in the physical sense of “land grabs.”161 Rather, dispossession in Santa Cruz is typified by the 
limitation of economic choices and subsequent supply chain entrapment. While land is certainly an 
important factor, the larger components of the ‘soy complex’ are indicative of the changing agrarian 
dynamics and processes of control. Those who control the storage, processing, distribution and export 
have much more influence over the soy industry than landowners themselves. 
Environmental Implications 
In addition to the implications of the concentrated cruceño soy industry on those in the value chain, the 
other central implication of Santa Cruz’s soy complex is the environmental degradation.  
Bolivia enumerates rights of Mother Nature in its Constitution, yet is also a country with some of the 
highest rates of deforestation162  and carbon dioxide emissions163. Deforestation has claimed 0.5 percent 
of forests every year over the last decade, showing “little respect for previous land use, protected areas or 
indigenous territories.” 164 865,000 acres of land have been deforested annually for agriculture since 2011, 
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an area nearly the equivalent of Rhode Island in size.165 According to the Bolivia Documentation and 
Information Center, this figure is compared to the 366,000 acres that were deforested in 1990.166 
Moreover, as part of its Patriotic Agenda 2025 (see below), Bolivia anticipates that it will clear 
approximately 14 million more acres to convert into farmland.167  
The rampant deforestation in Santa Cruz is predominantly driven by the soy industry’s exploitation of 
weak environmental protections.168  De Waroux conducted a study that looks into business decisions of 
companies on investment in Bolivia based on deforestation regulations and enforcements. The study 
found that the “availability of cheap forestland and lower deforestation regulations attract investments by 
companies that tend to clear more forest, mostly, and that lower enforcement attracts all companies.”169 
Bolivia holds ripe conditions for this investment climate where few restrictions are placed on land 
clearance and forest protections.  
The variance in regulations between countries can change the investment climate, and thus what has been 
happening in Latin America, and in Santa Cruz in particular, is engaging in regulatory competition to 
intentionally maintain low regulations.170 Law 1700 in Bolivia included only basic provisions for soil 
conservation and forest reserves, and its implementation varied significantly between provinces, and 
sanctions for illegal clearings and violations remained low.171 Moreover, the Forestry and Land Authority 
is tasked with “the potentially conflicting roles of regulating land use, forestry and agriculture, and 
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issuing concessions for logging and farming.”172  These low-bar protections and meager enforcement are 
matched with new legislation (Law 337) that grants amnesty to previous deforestation, further condoning 
the practice.173 These combined factors point towards a robust investment climate for agro-industrialists.  
Increased global demand for soy and the corresponding soy complex in Santa Cruz has tremendous 
impacts on the environment. Where regulations are in place, enforcement is significantly weak and illegal 
deforestation is commonplace. The goals to expand agriculture over the next decade (see Patriotic 
Agenda) has added fuel to the soy complex fire, as it is estimated that approximately 14 million more 
acres in Santa Cruz will be deforested in the coming decade for primarily soy cultivation.174  
Increased deforestation and illegal land clearance that have clear disregard for land ownership can have 
an increasing impact on indigenous territory as this complex further pushes into expanded eastern 
territory.175 Threats of increased deforestation on account of increased soy production per the Patriotic 
Agenda 2025 may spell out trouble for indigenous claims to consultation. In addition to the Constitution’s 
enumeration176 of the right to consultation (that has proven ineffective, above), the Constitution goes 
further in the realm of renewable natural resources, stipulating in Article 30.17 that indigenous 
communities have exclusive rights to renewable natural resources in their territory.177 However, this 
harkens back to the Guaraní issue addressed above in the definition of indigenous territory and the need 
for formal titles. As of 2006, only 11.1% of land had been titled in Santa Cruz.178 Therefore, future 
increases in expansion of soy production may lead to heightened contestations over titling. As the Guaraní 
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case exemplifies, the government’s role as arbiter of land titles and prioritization of economic 
development may mean a loss of autonomy over resource control on ancestral indigenous lands.  
Furthermore, Bolivia’s 1991 legislation, Law 22884: Reglameto de la Pausa Ecológica (RPE), requires 
consultation on deforestation near indigenous lands.179However, policy analysis on the law by the local 
NGO, CEJIS, finds that implementation has long been stalled due to lack of resources.180 In addition, 
deforestation not only impacts all Bolivians in relation to environmental degradation, but to indigenous 
culture. Article 30.7 of the Bolivian Constitution protects the right to indigenous sacred places.181  
Harbingers of increased production: 
In 2010, there was a discernable rapprochement of Santa Cruz elites and the Morales government in the 
concessions afforded to the former in the drafting of the 2009 Constitution. Following violent clashes in 
2008 between autonomist gangs and MAS supporters, negotiations were forged that conceded agricultural 
reforms that favored Santa Cruz’s elites.182 For instance, with the motivation to control large-scale land 
expansion, a 2008 referendum placed a 5,000 ha ceiling on landholdings. 183 “However, the government 
then negotiated with agro-industrialists to add a provision permitting an unlimited number of associates to 
hold up to 5,000 ha, as McKay summarizes, “essentially rendering the land ceiling futile.”184 
This concession not only paved the way for land concentration and soy expansion, but started an active 
dialogue of agricultural expansion as part of Bolivia’s larger economic strategy. As Vegara-Camus 
explains, “Evo Morales’ first 3 years were indeed very tense with the landed oligarchy of that region. But 
after this initial conflict, the state decided to support agribusiness in that region through institutional 
protection of large properties and the registration of more land to them. As a consequence, the area 
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planted with soybean soared.”185 Additionally, the high-quality, productive lands have been saturated by 
medium and largescale farms, whereas the titles given to communal lands are marginalized lands with 
less productive capacity and access to markets.186 
The Morales government has furthermore set the policy agenda for the future expansion of the soy 
industry and the important role of it in Bolivia’s economic aspirations. What is referred to as the Patriotic 
Agenda 2025, the government has set out goals to dramatically increase Santa Cruz agricultural 
exports.187 This agenda seeks to increase production volume and expand cultivated land by 1 million ha 
annually for the next ten years, expanding total cultivated land from 3.5 ha to 13.6 by 2015.188  
At present, conciliatory approach is underway between the Santa Cruz elites, soy producers and the 
Morales government.189 In fact, the only highlighted issue was the need for decreased export regulations 
in order to meet this 2025 goal.190 At present, the Morales administration has capped exports of soy at 
100,000-300,000 tons, though production exceeds 2 million tons per harvest and internal consumption is 
25%.191 As a result, producers claim that they cannot rely on government mechanisms to ensure fair price 
formation, estimating a loss of $135 million or more.192  
Agriculture in Santa Cruz is on a fast upward trajectory, with policy agendas to drastically increase the 
land under production by 278% from 3.5 ha to 13.6 ha, with a discernable export-orientation. With the 
alliance between Morales and the elites since 2010 and a soy expansion agenda, the human rights 
ramifications will likely be exacerbated by this increased push by the highly concentrated industry. The 
soy industry, with its unequal, concentrated power structure and export-orientation, is currently 
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threatening the smallholder’s realization of right to food. Coupled with the pre-existing regional tensions 
and government promotion of expanded agribusiness in the region, Santa Cruz’ soy industry is the next 
foreseeable frontier in the indigenous rights movement’s struggle for consultation and self-determination. 
IV. Analysis 
The soy industry’s negative impacts on the right to food and the environment show no signs of being 
alleviated by the state. Stakeholder interviews and analysis of indigenous groups in the eastern lowlands 
shows little organization around this very issue.193Rather, emphasis has been placed on imminent threats 
of extractivist development projects and the right to consultation, predominantly in the Guaraní regions of 
Santa Cruz.  
Mobilization Strategies: Past 
Eastern indigenous groups in Bolivia have a rich history of social movement participation and 
mobilization. The extent to which these strategies being used and updated to call for indigenous rights in 
the current Morales context will be discussed in this section.  
The indigenous electorate that propelled the MAS to power in 2006 stemmed from the indigenous rights 
movement of the 1990s.194 This nascent movement began in the eastern lowlands Santa Cruz region, and 
was supported by international institutions and NGOs following suit with the neoliberal tenet of “ethno-
development.”195 Early claims from these indigenous communities were for primarily localized and 
focused on rights to land (vis-à-vis recovering territory), education, and government services.196 At the 
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national level, the movement began engaging with other national indigenous organizations and 
transnational networks.197 
As indigenous social movements began taking hold, however, regional organization began shifting 
demands to the national. In August of 1990 indigenous communities from eastern lowlands, embarked on 
a 34 day march (March for Territory and Dignity) from Trinidad in the eastern region to La Paz, the 
nation’s capital situated in the western highlands.198 The objective of the march was to call for legal 
protections of indigenous land, which at the time was being confiscated by timber companies and migrant 
farmers from the highlands. The immediate result of the march was that the Zamora administration passed 
presidential decrees legally recognizing select indigenous territories.199 The 1990 march was a major 
advocacy push for Bolivia’s signing and ratification of the ILO Convention 169 the following year. 200  
Two landmark policy reforms that capitalized on this period of indigenous claims came in the mid-1990s. 
The first, was the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (LPP). The LPP granted full citizenship rights and 
opportunities for political representation.201 This in turn enabled the political opportunity structure for an 
opening for local mobilization.202 The second landmark reform under this neoliberal period was the Law 
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of the National Institute of the Agrarian Reform (INRA) in 1996.203 INRA created Tierras Comunitarias 
de Origen (TCOs), or native communitarian lands, which assigned collective land to indigenous 
communities.204  
 By the late 1990s, a shift of plurinational theories and paradigms emerged in Bolivia. This plurinational 
discourse emphasized interculturality over ethnic territoriality. This shift towards concepts of extra-
territorial indigeneity allowed for opening of ties between unions/peasants and indigenous in face of the 
mounting common enemy of neoliberalism.205  
Indigenous strategies in the eastern lowlands, such as those of the Guaraní, aligned interests and claims 
more broadly (transcending ethno-territorial boundaries) in order to confront the elites and pervasive 
colonialism in Santa Cruz. 206 By the late 1990s, the resulting effect was the shifting trend away from 
neoliberal ethno-development towards horizontal alliances across ethnic differences. By the early 2000s, 
indigenous mobilization strategies in Santa Cruz were typified by alliances with international NGOs and 
peasant unions utilizing non-violent tactics such as marches, blockades, and hunger strikes, to contest 
regional power hierarchies.207 
Though the neoliberal reforms progressed political, education, and land claims of the indigenous 
movement, the neoliberal structure and emphasis on decentralized ethno-development pervaded 
underlying issues. Neoliberal multiculturalism was not an altruistic aim or byproduct of decentralization, 
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but rather a pointed strategy.208 Though the neoliberal 1990s saw key reforms and emerging indigenous 
mobilization strategies, primarily marches as seen in the March for Territory and Dignity, it fell short of 
true indigenous autonomy and self-determination claims.  
In sum, the indigenous mobilization strategies deployed from 1990-2006 primarily consisted of trans-
indigenous, plurinational marches, blockades, and protests en masse. These strategies were directed at the 
aim of policy reform in the areas of land and territory, education, increased indigenous political 
representation. 
Mobilization Strategies: Present 
Though eastern indigenous groups and NGOs have utilized tactics209 similar to their mobilization 
strategies of the 1990s—marches, protests, and blockades—their aim, target, and issue-areas have 
evolved.  
The mobilization efforts of the 1990s pushed for legislation and policies that granted and stipulated 
indigenous rights. With the advent of the new Bolivian Constitution in 2009, the aim of indigenous social 
movements is full realization and implementation of their enumerated rights in the Constitution, with the 
primary focus of eastern indigenous mobilization is around the issue of consultation, territory, and state-
supported extractives projects.210  
In a post-2006 Bolivia in which the central government has been elected on a platform of indigenous 
rights, indigenous mobilization around the government’s extractivist policies211 did not come to the fore 
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until 2011 with the TIPNIS event, a pivotal event that triggered the fragmentation of the MAS coalition’s 
“unity.” 
The TIPNIS (Isobore Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory) case exemplifies the government 
prioritization of economic development projects, with the support of the peasant electorate, and the 
disregard for enumerated indigenous and environmental protections. The case refers to the planned 
construction of a highway that would connect Villa Tunarí in Cochabamba department with San Ignacio 
de Moxos in the Beni department to enable the expanded communications and commercial 
infrastructure.212   
Moreover, the road—supported by investment from Brazil—would circumvent Santa Cruz213 and directly 
connect the local coca growers (prime allies of Morales) to Brazil.214 The opposition response, comprising 
of predominantly lowland indigenous groups, urban middle class, and ecologists, was overwhelmingly 
negative. Citing the constitutional requirement for consultation, a public outcry and advocacy campaign 
began. On August 15, 2011 2,000 people left Trinidad for La Paz in the 1,500 km VIII Indigenous March 
for the Defense of TIPNIS. In September 2011, police violence against marchers broke out.215 And 
CSUTCB members, ardent supporters of Morales, attempted to block the march.216 
TIPNIS illustrated the political agenda of Morales and his disregard for indigenous rights and 
consultations in the face of furthering economic development and his allied interest groups (coca 
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farmers). Mass mobilizations and marches were met by violence.217 And opposition calls to respect the 
Constitution were met by a growing Morales tone of nationalism: “Letting a group of families tell us what 
to do would mean paralyzing all our work on electrification, hydrocarbons, and industries.”218  
Ultimately, the road through TIPNIS was not built; but the die had been cast for the future of the 
coalition. Stemming from the TIPNIS conflict, two eminent indigenous organizations represented in the 
MAS coalition CONAMAQ and CIDOB—withdrew from the Unity Pact.219 The TIPNIS case marks a 
pivotal moment in coalition fragmentation and the growing polarization between Morales’ nationalistic 
economic development aims and indigenous and environmental rights rhetoric. 
Until this moment, indigenous groups largely viewed President Morales as part of the indigenous 
movement and a “brother” of their struggle.220 However, a shift in mobilization strategy was seen 
following TIPNIS, when it became evident221 that pro-indigenous rhetoric and economic development 
policies were becoming increasingly divergent and contradictory, with the latter trumping the former.  
No longer appealing to Morales’ shared ethnic identity of indigenous, indigenous rights actors made 
claims to the contrary, saying that Morales is in not indigenous.222In fact, this was a common theme 
among Santa Cruz stakeholders I interviewed. “Morales’ authenticity claims of indigeneity fall flat. He is 
seen by many in the east as a campesino, not an indígena”223 The stakeholder notes that this comes out in 
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speeches and traditional ceremonies wherein Morales incorrectly pronounces indigenous words, for 
example.224  
The audience of these strategies now aren’t Morales, but rather the Bolivian people. Kuhn elaborates, 
“Although the movement appealed to the public to some degree before Morales took office, its 
interactions with the public are now more deliberate and more specifically framed around being in 
opposition to Morales.”225  
Therefore, it the indigenous movement in Bolivia is currently centered on the strategy of anti-identity of 
Morales. Not present in literature nor in stakeholder interviews conducted was the prioritization of the 
eastern lowlands indigenous movement around the issue of increased soy production and agribusiness in 
Santa Cruz. Rather, in Santa Cruz the pressing concern of the movement has largely dealt with the 
Guaranís struggle with asserting consultation claims amid government-supported extractivist projects. 
This is largely because of urgency and involvement.226 A small number of indigenous groups currently 
partake in soy production in Santa Cruz; and so the soy complex is not at the fore in the movement’s 
priorities. 
State Response 
A result of this counter-resistance to Morales by lowland indigenous groups has been a government 
suppression—both overt and covert. As aforementioned, the government has attempted to silence many of 
its vocal critics via threats, intimidation, or suspension of its activities.227 The NGO law is a prime 
example of the legal avenues Morales has taken to suppress civil society. More privately, the 
government’s strategy dividing the opposition can be seen in its tactic to infiltrate the opposition.228  
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Many of the once-dominant indigenous organizations in Santa Cruz, have split into two because many 
MAS loyalists and government cronies with top-down derivatives from La Paz form part of its core 
membership. CIDOB, a Santa Cruz-based eastern lowland indigenous organization that notably organized 
the TIPNIS march, has fractured into two: a MAS loyalist organization and a “dissident” organization.229  
The key to suppressing indigenous movement dissent is the division of regional actors. In her 2013 
research Kuhns explains, “[t]There are divisions within the movement as well, key among which is that 
between the highland and lowland indigenous. However, the movement unites as one force against the 
state because of its common goals such as defending native territory.”230 While the indigenous rights 
movement’s strong mass mobilization across inter-indigenous lines propelled the MAS to electoral power 
in 2006, this same strong united front poses a threat to the administration as it is increasingly distancing 
itself in policy (while maintaining allegiance rhetorically in international fora).231  
 “While the MAS came to power using these collective forms of organizations and mobilizations as its 
main instruments, mainly via protests, blockades, and collective voting, among others, indigenous 
movements have used these same mechanisms in cases of conflict. What is more, if the indigenous 
organizations that currently back Morales ever decide to withdraw such support, the same collective form 
of organization that once brought the party to power may be used to remove the MAS from 
government.”232 Therefore, it can be theorized that the infiltration and division of indigenous rights 
movements may be part of a larger government strategy in response to mobilization against the Morales 
administration.  
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These tactics by the government to divide and split lowland opposition are further complicated by Santa 
Cruz’ autonomous rhetoric. Both small producers and indigenous groups are the vulnerable parties to 
growing economic development, and both have fallen trap to the dominating power asymmetries and 
economic interests. Where there should be inter-cultural networks and alliances between these two groups 
to strengthen resistance, there currently is little to no space for collaboration. Just as the Morales 
government has used division as a tactic to stifle resistance, the Santa Cruz elites have deployed the 
regional discursive strategy of autonomous rhetoric to wedge the “native” indigenous groups and the 
migrant colonos groups. Though both stand to lose control and access to resources at the hands of the 
growing soy industry, these networks for mobilization are at present absent.  
V. Conclusion 
The present threat of development projects in Guaraní lands is a valid and present concern for indigenous 
rights activists in Santa Cruz. As noted above, however, the sector’s increased expansion agenda backed 
by the government is a stark harbinger that point towards its imminent threat to indigenous rights to 
consultation, self-determination and territory, and culture (vis-à-vis environmental degradation).  
As this research has indicated, the increased trend of soy production has been on a parallel track with the 
central government’s disregard for indigenous rights and prioritization of extractive industries over rights. 
With government rapprochement with business elites in Santa Cruz and new policy strategies for 
intensive soy expansion, it is feared that these two tracks will converge. As the soy complex pushes into 
further land expansions, neo-extractivist models pursued by the government may take on a new character 
in Santa Cruz.  
The soy complex’s large concentration in the region is matched by disparate resistance; and at present, 
there is little to no mobilization around this imminent crisis. Indigenous groups in Santa Cruz have 
mobilized around the extractives industry in the south of the department, as they see these as current 




procedures for extractives projects or disregard for constitutionally-enumerated rights and protections are 
a wearisome harbinger for increased violations. Though indigenous communal land is not currently 
enveloped in the soy complex, the government rapprochement and 2025 Patriotic Agenda to further 
expand the industry matched by their nationalist-driven disregard for rights could mean not only a 
squeeze for resources (already increasingly concentrated due to the mono-copped nature of soy) but for a 
clampdown of rights.  
It should be noted that though these threats are looming, there are present and real threats to small-farmers 
in regards to realizing the right to food and dispossession and dependence on capital markets due to the 
oligarchical nature of the soy supply chain. With indigenous groups and small holder farmers victims to 
power asymmetries both regionally and nationally, the deforestation, environmental degradation, and 
vicious cycles of small holder indebtedness and loss of autonomy are but first signs at what might be 
amplified with rampant expansion.  
Schisms both within indigenous groups and identification politics must be addressed in order to 
successfully mobilize. The breakdown of the MAS coalition and the resulting highland-lowland tensions 
have seen internal discord due to loyalty and dissident factions of eastern lowland indigenous groups. 
Moreover, regional autonomist rhetoric driven by Santa Cruz’s elites has pinned “native” lowlands 
indigenous groups against highland Andean indigenous migrants that actively engage in the soy value 
chain.  
Current indigenous mobilization strategies employed have not garnered substantial change, and 
increasingly the state is suppressing resistance—physically (police backlashes at protests, blockades), 
legally (NGO law), and tactically (infiltration of organized groups).  New resistance strategies, notably 
ones that form networks across marginalized groups in Santa Cruz, must take hold in order for these 
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